EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN SALARIES ORGANIZATION IN ADDITION CORPORATE TAX ESCAPING ON FIXED COST
Abstract
“This paper analyses the implications of earnings management and corporate tax avoidance on the value of firm. Using a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange over a period of ten years (2003– 2012), the study focuses on two pertinent issues: first, it analyses the relationship between earnings management (EM) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). Second, it empirically tests the effect of the interactions between the two variables on the value of the firm. The results suggest a pervasiveness of EM activities among sampled firms. It further reveals that managers employ avoidance techniques to manage earnings. Our sensitivity analyses suggests that, despite the positive influence of corporate tax avoidance on firm value, the effect is not significant to offset the negative impact of earnings management on firm value, thereby resulting in an overall negative effect on the value of the firm”.
Keyword : earnings management; corporate tax avoidance; firm value; developing country.
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